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Abstract 
 
The entry point for this paper is the premise that China’s principle of non-interference is one current debated issue in China’s 
contemporary engagement with Africa. Scholars have argued on the implications of this principle for consolidation of 
democracy, good governance and human rights in Africa. Others have pointed on the good of the principle, asserting that it 
has become an alternative for African governments to avert the Western imposition of conditionalities and their long procedural 
routine. The purpose of this paper is not to reiterate the well known gospel on the implications (positive or negative) of the 
principle but to examine the origin of this principle, particularly in Sino-Africa relations and the consistency or otherwise of 
China’s application of this principle in Africa. This paper with specific reference to Sudan and Zimbabwe seeks to examine the 
‘off’ and ‘on’ of this principle in China’s contemporary relations with Africa. Making use of both primary (interview) and 
secondary (journals, books, internet materials, memos etc) sources of data, this paper analysed what caused the shift (off) and 
what caused the maintenance of the stance (on) in China’s application of this principle in Africa.The study revealed that 
China’s application of non-interference principle in Africa has not been consistent. China’s insisting (switching on) or non- 
insisting (switching off) on non-interference policy is dictated by its primal national interest. For instance, China’s shifting of its 
stance on non-interference and persuading Sudan to accept the UN force has to do with its overriding interests at the time- 
hosting of the Olympics. Generally, non-interference principle apart from being a principle established in international law also 
serves as a tool that China sometimes employs to pursue its interests in its relations with Africa.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
China’s principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states is not a newly formulated principle. Although it dates 
back to the 1950s, it is one current debated issue in China’s contemporary engagement with Africa. It is unlikely for one 
to come across a study on China’s 21st century engagement with Africa without a mention of this principle and its 
implications for Africa’s relations with China; especially its implications for consolidation of democracy and respect for 
human rights in Africa. China’s principle of non-interference in Africa has increasingly drawn public criticisms with few 
exceptions; those who see it as the best approach in relations with sovereign states and those who see it as a model 
contrary to Western impositions and encroachment on the internal affairs of African states. 
As China continues to maintain an absolute stance (non-interference) in its external relations, debate has been on 
and on, on what China’s contemporary engagement portends for Africa. While Chinese leaders believe human rights are 
relative, and each country should be allowed to tackle it their own way without external interference, the West views 
human rights as a global issue that supersedes sovereignty and external interference is to be carried out when it has to 
do with human security.  
To the West, China’s principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs of other states is an irresponsible ‘see 
no evil’ approach which is bound to undermine human rights and democracy in Africa and European efforts to promote 
these values, as for example in Darfur and in Zimbabwe (Tull, 2008). China’s stance on non-interference principle was 
blamed for enabling the ruling forces in Sudan to carry out genocide and is considered to serve as a carrot for the 
dysfunctional government in Angola (Hodel, 2008). But China has argued that attempts by foreign nations to discuss 
democracy and human rights violate the rights of a sovereign country (Hanson, 2008).  China’s argument seemed to 
have gained acceptance with some African leaders. For most African countries that seem to be more concerned with 
getting rid of Western interference in their domestic issues and preserving national sovereignty, China seems to be an 
alternative to the Western economic prescriptions that are marred by aid conditionalites and the unnecessary foreign 
interference that seem to continuously disrupt their national sovereignty (Mutasa, 2009).  
Undoubtedly, China’s engagements with Africa especially in countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe have generated a 
lot of questions and debates on China’s principle of non-interference. This paper examines the origin of this principle and 
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tries to establish how China has used it in its early contact with Africa on to the present time. Key questions addressed 
are; is the application of this principle consistent (from China’s early contact with Africa on to the present time)? In other 
words, has the principle been on or off? What then caused the ‘off and on’ of China’s non-interference policy in its 
relations with Africa are all what this paper seeks to unravel. 
This paper is then organised as follows. Section II provides the background/origin of Chinese principle of non-
interference and varied notions/interpretations of the principle. Section III examines the application of this principle in 
early Sino-African relations and possible reasons for the ‘off or on switch.’ Section IV with reference to countries like 
Sudan and Zimbabwe examines its application (the consistency or otherwise) in the contemporary Sino-Africa relations. 
Section V drawing from the analysis from section III and IV makes the final conclusion. 
 
Origin of Chinese Non-Interference Principle with Varied Notions/Interpretations of the Principle 
 
Since the emergence of states with the treaty of Westphalia in 1948, international relations have been based on 
sovereignty, from where the principle of non interference was derived. Traditionally, sovereignty has been designated as 
the independence and supreme power of states to exercise their power over their respective territories.  Sovereignty is 
what Milojevic (2000) termed ‘the existence of exclusive internal competence of state which states must not interfere in.’ 
Rousseau (1974) cited in Milojevic (2000) called it the existence of ‘competence discretionaire’ of a state. Non-
interference is the counterpart principle of sovereignty and it usually encompasses all matters in which each state is 
permitted by international law to decide and act without intrusions from other sovereign states (IDRC, 2004). Thus, the 
principle of non-interference is the mirror image of the sovereignty of state (Wood, 2007). Non-interference stems from 
the traditional notions in international relations of equality of the sovereignty of states and the consequent right to 
exclusive sovereignty (Robin, 2000). Affirmately, IDRC (2004) noted that ‘the principle of non-interference in affairs that 
are within the domestic jurisdiction of states is the anchor to state sovereignty within the system of international relations 
and obligations.’  
It is a principle supported by Customary International Law and is well documented in the Charter of United Nations 
(Robin 2000), that almost every independent state subscribes to. Non-interference is one of the principles in international 
law that has been preserved in international organisations as well (Milojevic, 2000). In accordance with Article 2 (1) of the 
UN Charter, the world organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all member states (IDRC, 2004). 
Within the Charter of the UN, there is an explicit prohibition on the world organization from interfering in the domestic 
affairs of member states.   
For China, non-interference became weighty in the 1950s. Following US extended protection to the defeated 
nationalist Kuomintang - Taiwan government (currently referred to as the Republic of China) and its later interference in 
Korean War, China had to formalise the principle of non-interference in its external relations.  Indeed, China saw the step 
by the United States to protect Taiwan as ‘interference in Civil War’ (Ogunsanwo, 1974). What is more, with the US 
subsequent policy of isolating the Communists throughout the world, it was clear to China that the way out is to spell out 
this principle in its external relations to avoid external interference, and more importantly to disarray fears from its 
neighbours about suspicion of itself interfering in their affairs. Thus, in order to clear any suspicion of hegemonic 
behaviour for its neighbours, China first included ‘this principle’ in what it called ‘five principles of peaceful co-existence’ in 
Sino-Indian trade agreement signed in 1954. The five principles are 
1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism, old and new colonialism 
and to win and safeguard national independence.  
2. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of the African 
and Arab countries.  
3. It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own 
choice.  
4. It supports the African and Arab countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations. 
5. It holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should be respected by all other countries and 
that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed. 
These principles of peaceful co-existence with non-interference being one of them were wholly accepted by India, 
and the two countries pledged to maintain them in their relations. The document was widely publicised, and it heralded a 
new peaceful China whose attitudes would make the contemporary American efforts to form an anti-Communist united 
front in Asia superfluous and irrelevant (Ogunsanwo, 1974).  This policy initiative by China was carried on to the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, in Indonesia; the first most important International Conference held by Asian and African countries, 
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‘without the participation of any Western colonial power’ (Qiutian, 2005) to chart their course for development and 
liberation from colonialism and imperialism. The ten-point declarations formulated at the Conference were built upon the 
Chinese five principles of peaceful coexistence.  As Qiutian (2005) noted, the well-known ten principles of Bandung are 
the most important agreement reached by the Bandung Conference as an elaboration and development of the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence.   
Being that Bandung Conference created an avenue for China to link up with Africa officially and with the contact 
China made with Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt (sole African important figure at the Conference), China and Egypt 
established diplomatic relations in 1956. With many African countries gaining their independence by 1960 (seventeen 
African countries became independent in the year 1960, which is known as the ‘year of Africa’), Zhou Enlai embarked on 
a tour of Africa in 1963 and early 1964. Premier Zhou in that visit proposed the same five principles of peaceful 
coexistence to Africa together with the eight principles governing China’s aid to developing countries as the basic political 
and economic norms for developing Sino-African relations. Maintaining these principles with Africa dating to the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, Beijing staunchly supports the inviolability of African state sovereignty, noninterference in internal 
affairs, and the need for postcolonial nations to stand up to outside “bullying” and “hegemonism”(Gill, Huang and 
Morrison, 2007). Thus, China has historically held to a strict interpretation of sovereignty and professed its adherence to 
peaceful coexistence with other nations (Thompson, 2006).   
Nonetheless, ‘the principle of non intervention is also well established in contemporary international law’ (Wood, 
2007). It is reflected in many treaties, such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union. The International Court of Justice has reaffirmed in many occasions that non intervention principle is 
part of customary international law. Article 2.7 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that:  
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter.” 
The concept lies at the heart of both customary international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter and remains 
both an essential component of the maintenance of international peace and security and a defence of weak states 
against the strong (IDRC, 2004).   
However, if non-intervention is well established principle, why the varied notions? According to Ginn (n.d) there is a 
better reading of non-interference in harmony with international law; and it means that countries are prohibited from 
‘coercively’ intervening in each other’s internal affairs. This reading is in line with the major non-interference case 
(concerning Nicaragua and United States) held by International Court of Justice that drew the line between permissible 
and impermissible interference. In military and paramilitary activities in and Against Nicaragua, the International Court of 
Justice held that United States violated international law by providing funds and training to the Contra Rebels who sought 
to violently overthrow the Nicaraguan government; however, the court also held that a trade embargo, cessation of 
economic aid, and other economic measures did not violate the principle on non-interference (Ginn, n.d). The Court 
maintained that there are ‘matters in which each state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely’ 
(Wood, 2007) and as such should not be interfered with.  And also there are ways in which interference could be applied 
that would not violate the principle or sovereignty of a nation. Apparently, in International Court of Justice’s decision, what 
is prohibited is ‘dictatorial or coercive’ interference and not absolute non-interference.   
The interpretation of this principle still remains unclear and as such different views have continued to emerge. 
There are those I call the contingent thinkers (those that view non-interference as no longer absolute and could be altered 
by events, circumstances, especially when it has to do with human security or rights) and the absolutists (who view non-
interference as absolute and could not be altered at all even in face of human rights abuse).  
Given the changes in international relations, especially with United States as the sole superpower, new 
perceptions have emerged concerning the principle. Jones (2009) noted that after the cold war, non-interference became 
part of a political confrontation with the West, whose liberalising project threatened established domestic power relations. 
The growing interest in the security of people everywhere (human security) has questioned the idea of absolute 
sovereignty as argued by the Contingent thinkers. They maintained that ‘international actors have a responsibility to come 
to the aid of populations at risk in the face of repressive or weak states’ (1DRC, 2004). Reisman (1990) pointed that on a 
scale of values, the sovereignty of a state does not stand higher than the human rights of its inhabitants. Hence, ‘the view 
emerging from many quarters is that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct’ (Chopra and Weiss, 1992). The argument is 
that ‘in today’s globalising world, it is generally recognised that cultural, environmental, and economic influences neither 
respects borders nor require an entry visa’ (IDRC, 2004). Therefore invoking non-interference in issues that states are 
supposed to cooperate and offer solutions is what Ginn (n.d) report called ‘using non interference as a protective screen 
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for regimes that are acting in improper way.’  Such actions taken by the Security Council which most times are seen as 
‘intervention’ are believed by the Contingents to have ‘risen from the 2005 World Summit Outcome that confirms that 
enforcement actions to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are 
within the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII’ (Wood, 2007).  
For the absolutists’, the issue of human rights should not change the principle that upholds the sovereignty of a 
state. It is argued that, ‘if a country is stripped of its right to independence and sovereignty, how can its people realise 
their human rights’?(Thang, n.d).  Thang (n.d) argued that ‘to say that human rights rank above sovereignty is only a 
disguise used by neo-colonialists to intervene in internal affairs of sovereign countries.’ In furtherance of this argument, 
Thang (n.d) maintained that ‘a violation of national sovereignty means trampling upon the human rights of the entire 
people in that country.’   
Most developing countries, especially Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) still maintain that non-
interference is absolute. Scholars of Southeast Asia regionalism concur that ASEAN states hardly or hardly ever interfere 
in internal affairs of each other or of other states (Jones, 2009).  Apparently as Jones (2009) noted ‘non-interference is 
the single most important principle underpinning Asian Regionalism’,  even though ‘it has been blamed for arresting 
regionalism’ (Acharya, 2007), which evident in ASEAN being unable to confront important issues like military regime in 
Myanmar and humanitarian crisis in East Timor (Rahim, 2008). ASEAN strict adherence to non-interference may partially 
explain the bases for China’s consistent invocation of the principle, opposition and abstaining from any move to alter 
interference, even in human rights violations.  China and Russia had vetoed many actions by Security Council, for 
example the issue of UN intervention in Myanmar (Wood, 2007). China and Russia also vetoed the move by the 
international community to sanction Sudanese government during the Darfur conflict. The reason given by China and 
Russia was that ‘according to the United Nations Charter, it is only those questions that constitute threats to international 
peace and security that warrant discussion by the Security Council’ (Wood, 2007) and they believe situations in country 
like Myanmar, Sudan does not pose any threat to international or regional peace.  China and Russia have consistently 
argued that ‘the collective efforts by the UN to deal with internal problems of peace and security, and gross violations of 
human rights, including genocide, have therefore run against the grain of the claim to sovereign status as set out in the 
Charter (Wood, 2007). For China, sovereignty is seen as the common denominator among all nations regardless of other 
factors, and fundamentally holds that all countries should be equal and no country has the right to dictate the sovereign 
affairs of others. China is one of the leading countries that reject outright, any notions of human rights taking precedence 
over sovereignty, insisting that, “human rights essentially fall within the sovereignty of a country.” In bilateral relations, an 
independent, non-aligned and self reliant policy based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence is asserted as the 
centre piece of Chinese foreign policy (Kim, 1984). 
The controversy on the absolute or contingent nature of the principle continues on and on, with diverse 
understanding on the use of the principle; making the interpretation of the principle ambiguous. It is important further 
research dwells and clarifies more on the area where interference should come in and where it should not. 
 
China’s Non-Interference Policy in Africa from the 1960s: Off or On? 
 
In 1963 when Premier Zhou Enlai led China's first highlevel delegation to Africa, He carried the message that China and 
Africa shared a common experience and could build a new pattern of what would be later known as South-South 
cooperation, with non-interference policy being a recurrent theme. The visit made by Zhou won the favour of most 
Africans and its policies widely accepted. As El-Khawas (1973) pointed, among Africans there were widespread interests 
in Zhou’s tour since he was the first such important foreign leader to visit their continent.  
China’s sensitivities to perceived external interference particularly in the context of Taiwan and Tibet, led it to 
conceive of sovereignty in traditional Westphalian terms (Rafferty, 2010). Possibly, ‘this principle of noninterference has 
served to safeguard China’s own sovereign rights’ (Anshan, 2007). But has China maintained non-interference principle 
in its foreign relations, especially in relations with Africa? Has it been consistent in the application of this principle from the 
time it was enunciated in the 1950s?  
More than thirty years now, El-Khawas (1973) did a study on ‘China’s Changing policy in Africa’, and presented 
China’s role in Africa from the 1960s as aider of revolutionary groups.  At the advent of Sino-Soviet rift, China’s interest in 
Africa made China to become more interested in subduing Soviet’s influence than following the gospel of the principle of 
non-interference. Throughout that early period, the Chinese were acting largely as a force supplementary to the Soviet 
Union’s activities (Tareq, 1971). The burnishing of China's credentials as the main revolutionary power depended on 
winning more support in the developing world than in the Soviet Union (Segal, 1992). The period of Sino-Soviet rift was 
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one of the times that China’s principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states was put to a test.  China was 
accused of aiding revolutionary groups in Africa, training them for guerrilla warfare and attacks, which Africans leaders 
invariably saw as interference. In the Congo Crisis of 1964, China was accused of providing arms and training to 
members of the National Liberation Committee based in Congo Brazzaville led by Pierre Mulele. Peking’s (now Beijing) 
affiliation with revolutionary groups and interference in affairs of Africans frightened a number of African leaders as they 
began to express their grave concerns over Chinese activities. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, for 
instance, voiced then that “…….. the peril that menaces Africa today is the yellow-tinted Communism of Peking”( Cited in 
El-Khawas, 1973).  Most African leaders saw Chinese activities in that period as nothing short of interference or 
‘intervention in their internal affairs.’ The then President Hamani Diori of Niger called a meeting of the Common 
Organisation of African and Malagasy States (OCAM) to work out a plan to cope with Chinese threat. This led to Chinese 
diplomats being declared persona non grata in ten states of the OCAM, including Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Madagascar 
and Senegal (El-Khawas, 1973). Four other African countries (Burundi, Central African Republic, Ghana and Tunisia) 
broke diplomatic relations with China in 1966. Kenya expelled Chinese diplomats during the period (George, 1966).  In 
fact, Kenya’s governing party, Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) on learning of Chinese support to the opposition 
Party, the Kenya People’s Union, issued a statement warning: 
 
“Events in Africa during 1966 and continuing instability in some parts of the continent make it easy, and in fact inviting, for 
some countries to feel that they can meddle in the affairs of African states. Forces are anxious to sow the seeds of suspicion 
among neighbouring states. Confusion and instability in Africa benefit such forces. It is important that the African countries 
be on their guard against the intrigue and manipulations of these forces which only purpose must be to destroy that which 
we are trying to build. Any party which relies on the inspiration and support of outsiders cannot be regarded as a genuine 
nationalist organisation and must be looked upon with suspicion by the people of this country (Cited in Larkin, 1971)”  
 
Though ‘China out-rightly denied such accusations’ but diplomatic relations nevertheless deteriorated (El-Khawas, 
1973). The height of which was Africa’s severing of diplomatic relations with China. To sever existing relations is a highly 
charged and symbolic act, since most states do not effect a diplomatic rupture without intending to show profound 
disapproval of other country; the breaks between China and African countries seem to imply that China committed grave 
and improper deeds, forcing African retaliation (Larkin, 1971). China passed through the decade of the 1960s under a 
cloud of suspicion over its radical revolutionary posture and competition with the former Soviet Union for allies 
(Bukarambe, 2005). Rafferty (2010) affirmed that the principle was regularly violated by the support China lent to 
revolutionary movements across Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Arguably the principle of non-interference was 
switched off by China from the record of China’s role in the 1960s. It was when diplomatic relations was ruptured with 
many African countries that China had to revisit its non-interference policy in Africa.  
One could argue on one hand, that there is possibility that China has learnt from its experience to follow strictly the 
principle of non-interference (to maintain normal relations with all types of regimes- autocratic or democratic) or risk 
African countries for Taiwan (Taiwan is an inalienable part of China as China has maintained and must not gain any 
recognition from any country; it is important to note that it was Taiwan’s case that made China to expound the ‘One China 
Policy’ in its foreign relations). On the other hand, it could also be argued that the switching off the principle at that period 
could be that there was something more important than the principle (the desire to gain more influence than Soviet Union; 
and win more allies).  
But knowing fully well that African votes count a lot for her in UN, China had to ‘switch on’ the principle of non-
interference to avert more diplomatic rupture in its relations with Africa. China’s ‘diversion of approach’ in its African 
relations became evident when the then Mali’s President Modibo Keita was ousted in November 1968. China promptly 
contacted the military junta …..despite the fact that Modibo had been one of China’s few friends in Africa (El-Khawas, 
1973). The ‘switching on’ of the application of the principle by China apparently contributed in many African countries 
support for China’s regaining of its seat in UN Security Council in 1971. On the direct vote on the resolution concerning 
China’s re-admission, seven African nations shifted their voting positions, all in directions favourable to China. Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and Togo switched from “no” to “yes”, while Botswana, Cameroun, Senegal and Tunisia changed from 
abstention to affirmative, with no abstention recorded at all among the African votes. 26 out of the 76 votes in the United 
Nations came from Africa. China has continued to profess non-interference in Africa. 
 
China’s Non-Interference Policy in Africa in the 21st Century: Off or On? 
 
Although the official drivers of China’s African approach had been dramatically redefined by the turn of the 21st century, 
the political relationship, on the surface at least retained some similarities to what was seen in the 1960s and 1970s 
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(Kobus and Dirk, 2006). China’s principles of peaceful coexistence constituted a whole set of China’s policy in expanding 
Sino-African cooperation and laid the foundation for new type of relationship (Gongyuan, 1996). President Hu stated in 
his keynote speech at the CCP’s 17th National Congress in Beijing in October 2007 that: 
 
“Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an equal footing in a common 
endeavour to promote democracy in international relations.  Economically, they should cooperate with each other, draw 
on each other’s strength and work together to advance economic globalisation in the direction of balanced 
development, shared benefits and win-win progress” (cited in Lanteigne, 2009) 
 
Following the unfavourable times of China-Africa relations (for instance the diplomatic rupture with some African 
countries in the early 1960s) and the favourable times, for instance African support at the UN, China revisited its African 
policy. China needed to reassure African leaders of its support on fostering its development and also its position on non-
interference as the basis of its foreign relations. China continued to upheld the view that ‘the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence are not only the basic norm of international relations but also the essential means of ensuring international 
peace and security’ (Kim, 1984).  
In 2000, a new China-Africa Cooperation Forum (the first of its kind in Sino-Africa relations) agreed on a joint 
economic and social program, one that is grounded on the traditionally defined doctrine, “the five principles of peaceful 
co-existence.” Also in 2003, Ambassador Zhang Yishan, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United 
Nations, summed up China’s non-interference posture when he stated:  
 
‘Externally imposed conditions do not offer genuine solutions to African problems; in many instances, liberalisation, 
privatisation, market reform and other re-adjustment programs not only are incapable of promoting African economic 
growth but on the contrary have created serious social problems.’ (cited in Thompson 2006) 
 
Yishan went on to say that ‘the international community should therefore fully acquaint themselves with the real 
circumstances of the African countries and respect their sovereign choices’ (cited in Thompson, 2006). On the year 
marking China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Africa in 2006, China published a major policy document 
outlining the new directions of its Africa policy. The Africa policy document is firmly in line with the same five principles of 
peaceful co-existence. The document pointed two fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy; the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs of other states and the ‘One China Principle’ (Tjonneland et al, 2006).  
On many subsequent international occasions, China has continuously committed itself publicly that it respects the 
rights of African people in choosing their own route to development and way of life and China will never interference in 
the internal affairs of any sovereign countries (Susu, 2006). In the author’s interview with Mr Frank, Chinese Country 
Attache at the Commercial Section, Embassy of People’s Republic of China, Lagos, Nigeria, on 5 November, 2011, Mr 
Frank maintained ‘that the sovereignty of any country takes precedence over any human rights and China is not prepared 
to interfere in any sovereign state. He went on to say that China believes in assisting Africa to develop and not on the 
preaching of human rights without food. To Frank, ‘issues in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola etc that China are accused of 
fuelling are all African internal problems that China could not have interfered with; China only assists Africa in areas 
where Africa calls for help.’ 
Possibly, China’s re-arrival in Africa with great emphasis on non-interference could also be due to the support 
China received from most African countries (‘who did interfere in China’s affairs’) in the wake of Tiananmen Square Crack 
down in 1989. Many African States rallied to Beijing’s defense after Western nations criticised and imposed sanctions on 
China (Feinstein, 2007).  Also Africa has supported China in human rights issues at the United Nations. Over the past 
decade, human rights proposals against China were defeated 11 times at the United Nations, which Anshan (2007) noted 
that ‘without African nations support, China could not have defeated those proposals.’ Ordinarily China’s human rights 
issues being debated at the UN would have made China to realise that it has its own domestic problems of human rights 
and corruption that make it difficult for her to criticize others.  
China’s non-interference as explained above is not a new principle that China just put forward in the 21st century 
but arguably its application has become more pronounced at the moment. China’s current roles in countries like Sudan 
and Zimbabwe have become more contentious because of the issue of China’s principle of non-interference. An 
assessment of how this principle is currently applied (off and on) by China in these two countries is done below.  
 
1.1 Sudan 
 
Sino-Sudan relation is not new. Though not independent at the Bandung Conference of 1955, Sudan through its 
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participation at the Conference shared the ‘Bandung Spirit’ and ten principles that emanated from the Conference, which 
was built on Chinese five principles of peaceful coexistence. After gaining its independence on 1st January 1956, Sudan, 
on 4th February 1959 became the third African country to establish diplomatic relations with China after Egypt (May 30, 
1956) and Morocco (November 1, 1958). Sudan was among the ten African countries visited by Zhou Enlai in his first tour 
of Africa.  Zhou Enlai received friendlier welcome in Sudan in 1964 (Tareq, 1971). The relations between China and 
Sudan have continued to strengthen following China’s economic development and the need for oil which Sudan is 
endowed with. Beijing has been a long standing investor in Sudan’s energy sector since 1996. Its investment in Sudan is 
said to be ‘the largest African international investment made by China in the energy sector’ (Frynas and Paulo, 2007). 
China is the biggest investor in Sudan’s $15 billion 932-mile oil pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea where China is 
also building a tanker terminal(Malaquias, 2007). Although Angola provides China with most of its oil, Sudan hosts 
China’s biggest oil investment overseas. Considering that Sudan only began exporting oil in 1999, there is every chance 
that Sudan will surpass Angola in supplying China with oil in the future. Currently, roughly 60 percent of Sudan’s oil is 
destined for China, making up 12 percent of Chinese oil imports (Thompson, 2007).  
China’s current relations with Sudan have been criticised based on China’s principle of non-interference. This 
criticism arose because despite the war and the then human rights violations in Darfur, China maintained its stance on 
non-interference in Sudan’s affairs. To underscore the point, Chinese officials have repeatedly argued that attempts by 
other countries to link positions on democracy and human rights to economic integration violate the rights of sovereign 
countries (Baseda et al, 2008).  The Deputy Chinese Foreign Minister when interviewed on the situation in Sudan in 2004 
was quoted to have said: 
 
Business is business. We try to separate politics from business…. Sudan’s situation is an internal affair and we have no 
right to impose upon them.You (the West) have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these 
countries which are not ready for it. We are also against embargoes, which you have tried to use against us (cited in 
French, 2004).  
 
In September 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1564 which condemned the 
mass killing of civilians in the Darfur region but stopped short of imposing sanctions if Khartoum did not act to stop the 
killing because China abstained from the vote and threatened to veto any further move to impose sanctions (Sautman 
and Hairong, 2007).  
Until 2006, China had argued against attempts by the United Nations to punish the government of Al-Bashir for the 
then conflict in Darfur. China has consistently pointed that it does not ‘mix business with politics.’ Although the phrase 
‘business’ remains ambiguous. It depends on what China means by its ‘business’ at a particular time. It could be where 
its interests lie most. For instance, China has large investment in Sudan’s oil sector and would not want to compromise 
that. It could also be that China craves more for economic development and for now, not political development as was 
pointed by Mr Frank the Country Attache at the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in an interview with the 
author; and that could be the reason China’s domestic economy booms and its human-rights dooms.  Besides, China’s 
maintaining of non-interference even in gross human rights violations in countries like Sudan could be China’s way of 
making sure that diplomatic relations are not ruptured. Generally, if China had decided to support opposition groups for 
instance in Sudan’s conflict, this may result to severing of diplomatic relations (which China would not want to happen 
again as seen in its early contact with Africa, for as the saying goes ‘once beaten, twice shy’). And rupture of diplomatic 
relations may even cost China losing such country to Taiwan, an important foreign policy objective that China is 
struggling to counter.  
Arguably, China’s national interests and foreign policy objectives take precedence in decisions. As Mark (2008) 
pointed the principle of non-interference is often seen especially in relation to Sudan and Zimbabwe, merely as a cynical 
cloak for the pursuit of China's national self-interest regardless of human rights and good governance issues. 
It is noteworthy that China’s stance on interfering in Darfur’s conflict was shifted later in 2006. As the international 
calls for potential Olympic boycott (China was to host 2008 Olympic) over Darfur became more strident, Beijing in the 
autumn of 2006 shifted its stance and had to persuade the Sudanese government to accept a tandem UN-African Union 
(AU) peacekeeping force under an agreement in Addis Ababa (Lanteigne, 2009). To convince Sudan to accept the UN-
African Union peacekeeping force, China announced the cancellation of Sudanese debt and promised to build Al-Bashir a 
presidential palace (Shinn, 2007). Given China’s interest in hosting the Olympic, China applied different strategies to 
make Sudan agree. In March 2007, China’s main Economic Planning Agency, the National Development and Reform 
Commission, released a public document in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Commerce, noting that Sudan had been removed from the latest list of countries with preferred trade status (McGregor, 
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2007). According to the announcement, Beijing would no longer provide financial incentives to Chinese companies to 
invest in Sudan. This latest move appeared to be a signal of Chinese disaffection with Al-Bashir’s unwillingness to comply 
with his commitments to implement the Annan Plan (Gill et al, 2007). But more importantly China had to apply these 
means to make sure nothing comes in the way of its hosting of the Olympic, which was already then labelled ‘the 
Genocide Olympic.’ This shift from China ‘was seen as unsurpassed importance Beijing attached to the success of its 
hosting of the Olympic games in 2008’ (Reeves, 2007). Apparently, China realised the importance of the Olympic to 
project its image and economic development to the world. Hosting Olympic invariably at that time is a more paramount 
interest than the economic interest (oil) in Darfur (though oil is still very important). But China has Angola (its major oil 
market in Africa) to substitute for Darfur’s oil.  
Prior to the 2008 Olympic, Beijing has been very emphatic about maintaining its sovereignty and has resisted 
international calls for greater democracy and human rights, arguing that such areas must be addressed by ‘Beijing only 
and at a pace which China itself is most comfortable’ (Lanteigne, 2009). Thus, China in the real sense of it addressed 
Sudan’s issue at the time and pace it was most ‘comfortable or ‘favourable as the case may be.  It is obvious that an 
overriding interest resulted to shift in China’s position in Sudan. And this is what I called ‘switching off’ of non-interference 
principle in Sudan.  To Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, cited in Hanson (2008), ‘Beijing’s recent handling 
of the situation in Sudan shows that it is learning the limitations of non-interference…..’ Thompson (2007) emphasises 
that China’s “non-interference” is Orwellian language for a malleable concept that is prescribed when it best serves 
China’s purpose, economic gain.’ For instance, in the Zambia’s 2006 presidential elections, the leading opposition 
candidate, Michael Sata, ran on an anti-China platform. In a strong contradiction to the spirit of China’s foreign policy 
approach (non-interference), China threatened to cut all economic ties with Zambia if Sata won the election. Thompson 
(2007) pointed, ‘the case demonstrated that China has very little patience for internal politics that would jeopardize their 
economic interests.’ It is important to note that China’s shifting of its stance in Sudan was not total as China’s arms sales 
never stopped. The major shift was to give way to a more primal interest at the time. 
 
1.2 Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe is another case in point. There has been longstanding relationship between China and Zimbabwe dating from 
the early Chinese support of the opposition leader and now President Mugabe (Lanteigne, 2009). The largest project 
China undertook in Africa in the 1970s was Tan-Zam railway construction.  What is more, China’s support for Zimbabwe 
spans over three decades. During Zimbabwe’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, China provided logistical training, 
arms and funding support to Mugabe’s Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) liberation front. When Mugabe was 
elected he disbanded the rival political party and, with the support of China and the Shona speaking majority, has 
remained in power for over 25 years(Butts and Bankus, 2009). 
After Americans and Europeans withdrew from the country due to the government's destructive land reform 
program and poor human rights record, China stepped in, ready to work with the resource-rich African nation. Zimbabwe 
has the second largest deposit of platinum in the world, which is of great interest to China.  China’s policy of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states is central to its appeal to Mugabe as a trading partner. China has been 
very active in support of Zimbabwe, which is “patria non grata” in the West (Rourke, 2006).  
China’s link with Robert Mugabe has triggered much debate on the implications of China’s principle of non-
interference for good governance and human rights protection in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole. For almost a decade 
now, the Mugabe government had come under mounting international criticism both for an increasingly authoritarian 
stance, suppression of personal freedoms and for widespread economic mismanagement and draconian land reform 
which exacerbated poverty levels in the southern African country (Lanteigne, 2009). The West imposed sanctions on 
Mugabe and China being a ‘non-interference actor’ offered an alternative for Mugabe. Mugabe has since 2003 adopted a 
‘look east policy.’ In 2008, following the widespread irregularities during the general election, the West took up Mugabe’s 
case again in United Nations and was ready to impose sanctions when China and Russia vetoed it.  China and Russia 
argued that the issue was an internal matter outside of the United Nations Security Council jurisdiction and best solved by 
talks between the government and opposition leaders (Lanteigne, 2009). Increasing isolation and pressure from the West 
have caused Zimbabwe to develop close relations with China…….where China now provides Mugabe with a lifeline to 
resist Western sanctions and criticism (Watts and Meldrum, 2005).  
China provides for Mugabe’s military needs without interfering in his internal affairs and praises Mugabe as a man 
of great achievements, devoted to world peace and a good friend of the Chinese (Dickie and Reed, 2005). China’s 
principle of non-interference is yet to experience any shift (what I called ‘switching off’) in Zimbabwe.  
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It is expected that China’s stance in Zimbabwe will shift with time, with the arrival of a more paramount interest (be 
it political or economic) as seen in Sudan. Gill et al (2007) have pointed that adhering to a formal policy of 
noninterference and putting it into consistent practice will be difficult and likely clash over time with deepening Chinese 
interests as China will increasingly face mounting pressures to support humanitarian intervention in Africa. To Tjonneland 
et al (2006), it is extremely difficult to navigate safely between a foreign policy that must at the same be in the service of 
economic modernisation… be a constructive partner in international development, and simultaneously stick to the 
principle of non-intervention.  
Ordinarily, adhering completely with non-interference is irreconcilable with China’s paramount interest (whether 
political or economic interests in Africa). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Undeniably, Chinese principle of non-interference is not a new principle in Sino-Africa relations. Though the principle 
remained unchanged, its application has failed to be consistent in its relations with Africa. The paper has revealed that 
both in China’s early and present contact with Africa, the application of non-interference principle has not been entirely 
consistent. In the early times, the principle of non-interference was almost not in existence in Sino-Africa relations. The 
principle as argued by the author ‘switched off’; and this switching off was mainly caused by the Sino-Soviet rift; China 
wanted to win more allies than the Soviet Union and it had to switch off the principle to aid revolutionary groups in Africa.   
In its 21st century involvement with Africa, the principle has gained much significance in Sino-Africa relations. But 
what is revealed from the study is that in both China’s 20th and 21st century relations with Africa; the principle does not 
take prominence over China’s national interests at any time. China ‘switches on’ the principle until more paramount 
interest (political or economic interest) arises. In the case of Sudan, China later shifted its stance on non-interference. 
China saw the importance of hosting the Olympic and had to shift its stance on persuading Sudan to accept the UN force. 
The hosting of Olympic became more paramount than oil (Sudan’s oil). Clearly, China’s principle of non-interference had 
undergone series of shift, primarily due to China’s pressing or overriding interest at the time.  
Conclusively, notwithstanding that China continues to reiterate the gospel of non-interference, its application has 
not been fully consistent in its relations with Africa as its application is tied to China’s overriding national interests at any 
time. Thus, it is important further study examines the role China’s national interests play with regards to its foreign policy 
especially its African policy. 
 
References 
 
Acharya, Amitav. (2007). ‘East Asia’s Arrested Regionalism’ Paper Presented at Asia Studies Seminar, St Anthony’s College Oxford, 23 
February 2007 
Anshan, Li. (2007). China and Africa: Policy and Challenges. China Security, Vol.3, No.3, World Security Institute 
Baseda, Hang; Wang, Yang and Whalley, John. (2008). China’s Growing Economic Activity in Africa. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper, http://www.nber.org Accessed April 10, 2007 
Bukarambe, Bukar. (2005). Nigeria-China Relations: The Unacknowledged Sino Dynamics. Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 
Lagos 
Butts, Kent H. and Bankus, Brent. (2009). China’s Pursuit of Africa’s Natural Resources. Centre for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War 
College, June, Vol. 1-09 
Chopra, Jarat and Weiss, W Thomas .(1992). “Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 
Dickie, Mure and Reed, John. (2005). “China Hails Mugabe’s Brilliant Diplomacy”. Financial Times, July 27. http://www.news.ft.com 
Accessed July 28, 2005 
El-Khawas, A. Mohammed. (1973). China’s Changing Policies in Africa. A Journal of Opinion, Vol.3, No.1, pp.24-28, http://www.jstor.org 
Accessed August 15, 2009 
Feinstein, Lee. (2007). China and Sudan. http://www.tpmcafe.com Accessed September 19, 2007 
French, Howard (2004) “China in Africa: All Trade and No Political Baggage,” http://www.globalpolicy.org Accessed May 5, 2007 
Frynas, Jedizej George and Paulo, Manuel. (2007). A New Scramble for Africa Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives. 
African Affairs, The Journal of the Royal African Society Vol. 106, No. 423 
George T.Yu. (1966). China’s Failure in Africa, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, pp.461-468 
Gill, Bates; Huang, Chin-Hao and Morrison J. Stephen. (2007). China’s Expanding Role in Africa: Implications for the United States. A 
Report of the CSIS Delegation to China on China-Africa-U.S Relations, November 28-December 1, 2006 
Gill, Bates; Huang, Chin-Hao and Morrison, J. Stephen. (2007). Assessing China’s Growing Influence in Africa. China Security, Vol.3, 
No.3 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
         MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 4 No 3 
September 2013 
 
 234 
Ginn, David. (n.d). The Abused Notion of Non-Interference. Being A Report Prepared For Asean Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus. 
http://www.aseanmp.org Accessed October 10, 2010 
Gongyuan, Chen. (1996). Towards A 21st Century Sino-African Relationship. Foreign Affairs Journal, The Chinese People’s Institute of 
Foreign Affairs, December, No.42 
Hanson Stephanie. 2008. China, Africa and Oil. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org Accessed December 18, 2009 
Hodel, Mikel. (2008). The Scramble for Energy: China’s Oil Investment in Africa. The Journal of International Policy Solutions, Vol.9 
IDRC. (2004). State Sovereignty. http://www.idrc.ca Accessed September 8, 2010  
Jones, Lee. (2009). ASEAN’s Unchanged Melody? The Theory and Practise of ‘Non-Interference in South East Asia. Paper Presented 
for International Boundary Research Unit’s ‘The State of Sovereignty’ conference, University of Durham, 1-3 April 2009. 
Kim, S. Samuel. (1984). China and the Third World: In Search of a Neorealist World Policy, In China and the World, ed. Westview Press. 
Kobus, Van der Wath and Dirk, Kotze. (2006). China and Africa: A Neglected Opportunity. African Analyst Quarterly 
Lanteigne, Marc. (2009). Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction. Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York 
Larkin, D. Bruce. (1971). China and Africa (1949-1970). University of California Press, California 
Malaquias, Assis. (2007). Thirsty Powers: United States, China and Africa’s Resources. http://www.africacenter.org Accessed May 2, 
2010 
Marks, Stephen. (2008). Understanding China’s Strategy: Beyond Non-Interference. http://www.pambazuka.org Accessed April 5, 2010 
McGregor, Richard. (2007). “Iran, Nigeria, Sudan off China incentive list,” Financial Times, March 2, 2007, http://search.ft.com 
Milojevic, Momir. (2000). The Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of States. Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.1, No.4, pp.427-
447 
Mutasa, C. (2009) ‘Aid Effectiveness and the Question of Mutual Accountability’ in Abbas, H and  Niyiragira, Y. 2009. Aid to Africa-
Redeemer or Coloniser?, London, Pambazuka Press 
Ogunsanwo, Alaba. (1974). China’s Africa Policy (1958-1971). Cambridge University Press 
Qiutian, Lu. (2005). Carrying Forward the Spirit of Bandung Conference and Steadfastly Following the Path of Peaceful Development.  
The Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, No.75 
Rafferty, Tom. (2010). China’s Doctrine of Non- Interference Challenged by Sudan’s Referendum. China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 25 
Rahim, Lily Zubaidah. (2008). ‘Fragmented Community and Unconstructive Engagement: ASEAN and Burma SPDC Regime’, Critical 
Asian Studies, 40:1  
Reeves, E. (2007). China, Darfur and the Olympic: Tarnishing the Torch? http://www.dreamfordarfur.org Accessed June 5, 2009 
Reisman, W.Michael. (1990). “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” American Journal of International 
Law 
Robin, Ramcharan. (2000). ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained. Contemporary South East Asia Journal, 
http://www.highbeam.com Accessed October 2, 2010 
Rourke, Breffni O’. (2006). China: Africa Trade Offensive Part of Global Expansion. http://www.radiofreeeurope.com Accessed August 
10, 2006 
Sautman, B. and Hairong, Y. (2007), Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa in African Studies Review, Vol.50, No.3 
Segal, Gerald. (1992). China and Africa. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.519, China’s Foreign 
Relations, pp.115-126, http://www.jstor.org  Accessed June 5, 2008 
Shinn, S. David. (2007). Africa, China, United States and Oil. CSIS African Policy Forum. http://www.csis.org Accessed April 4, 2006 
Susu, Xing. (2006). Sino-African cooperation in the 21st Century: A Strategic Partnership. Foreign Affairs Journal, The Chinese People’s 
Institute of Foreign Affairs, June, No.80 
Tareq Y. Ishmael, (1971). The People’s Republic of China and Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, No.4, pp.507-529 
http://www.jstor.org Accessed May 8, 2007 
Thang, Duc Nguyen. (n.d). Nature of the Theory “Human Rights Rank Above State Sovereignty” http://www.presscenter.org.vn 
Accessed August 18, 2010  
Thompson, Drew. (2006). China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States. African 
Renaissance Journal 
Thompson, J.P. (2007). China’s Crucial Role in Africa. Africafiles/At Issue Ezine. http://www.africafileatissueezine.com Accessed 
January 18, 2008 
Tjonneland, Elling N, Bjorn Brandtzeag, Ashild Kolas, and Garth le Pere. (2006). China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and 
Development Policies.  Available at www.cmi.no/publication.  Accessed August 15, 2008 
Tull, Denis. (2008). China in Africa: Europeans Perceptions and Responses to the Chinese Challenge. School of Advanced International 
Studies. http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/africa   Accessed February 10, 2010 
Watts, Jonathan and Meldrum, Andrew. (2005). ‘Mugabe Finds Succour in Beijing Deals.’ The Guardian, July 27, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk Accessed August 5, 2005 
Wood, Micheal. (2007). The Principle of Non-Interference in Contemporary International Law: Non-Interference in a State’s Internal 
Affairs Used to be a Rule of International Law; Is it Still? A Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion Group 
Meeting Held on 28 February 2007 
